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SPINOZA, ENLIGHTENMENT, 
AND CLASSICAL GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 
– Sebastian Gardner –
Abstract. This paper offers a critical discussion of Jonathan Israel’s thesis that the political and 
moral ideas and values which define liberal democratic modernity should be regarded as the 
legacy of the Radical Enlightenment and thus as deriving from Spinoza. What I take issue with is 
not Israel’s map of the actual historical lines of intellectual descent of ideas and account of their 
social and political impact, but the accompanying conceptual claim, that Spinozism as filtrated by 
the naturalistic wing of eighteenth-century French thought, is conceptually sufficient for the 
ideology of modernity. The post-Kantian idealist development, I argue, qualifies as radical, and 
hinges on Spinoza, but its construal of Spinoza does not fit Israel’s thesis, and reflects an 
appreciation of the limitations, for the purpose of creating a rational modernity, of the naturalistic 
standpoint represented by thinkers such as d’Holbach. 
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1. Jonathan Israel’s Spinoza-thesis
Jonathan Israel’s overarching claim is bold and provocative: 
But is it likely, one might well object, or even conceivable, that any single 
seventeenth-century author [...] can have fundamentally and decisively shaped 
a tradition of radical thinking which eventually spanned the whole continent, 
exerted an immense influence over successive generations, and shook western 
civilization to its foundations? Can one thinker be said to have forged a line of 
thought which furnished the philosophical matrix, including the idea of evolution, 
of the entire radical wing of the European Enlightenment, an ideological stance 
subscribed to by dozens of writers and thinkers right across the continent from 
Ireland to Russia and from Sweden to Iberia? The answer, arguably, is yes. 
[...] Fundamental shifts in the mental world of western civilization no doubt 
originate in vast social forces and a multitude of cultural influences. But the 
examples of Erasmus and Calvin remind us how a few wholly outstanding 
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individual minds may, at crucial moments, through their thoughts and writings, 
lend decisively formative expression to rising impulses across an entire continent.1 
The ”one thinker” is of course Spinoza. Israel’s highly ambitious and 
original claim – highlighted in the sub-title of Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy 
and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750 – is therefore not simply that Spinoza’s 
legacy endures, that there forms in Spinoza’s wake an identifiable tradition 
of reflection in accordance with his principles, but that Spinoza inaugurates 
an intellectual development which succeeds in converting itself into an ideological 
stance which reshapes western civilization. I will refer to this as Israel’s 
Spinoza-thesis. Radical Enlightenment is devoted to charting the formation, 
dissemination, and development of Spinoza’s ideas in the early modern period, 
but there is no mistaking Israel’s view that constitutive normative features of the 
modern world go back to what he identifies as the Enlightenment’s more radical 
and authentic form and thus to Spinoza. 
Israel makes it clear that his aim goes beyond matters de facto and concerns 
also the de jure question of (in Hans Blumenberg’s formulation) the ”legitimacy” 
of modernity. Israel believes that, for ”anyone authentically committed to 
democracy, toleration, and personal liberty”, Stephen Bronner’s claim that 
Enlightenment thinking remains the best foundation for any genuinely 
progressive politics is ”undeniable”. The radical Enlightenment claim is that” the 
improvement of human life inescapably involves emancipating men from 
the collective force of autocracy, intolerance, and prejudiced thinking, and 
establishing a predominantly secular morality, no less than it involves promoting 
the ideals of equality (sexual and racial), democracy, individual liberty, and 
a comprehensive toleration”; the claim is ”concretely superior in terms of reason 
and moral equity not just to what one faith or traditional system or another 
contends, in opposition to its claims, but absolutely – that is in ethical and political 
as well as social terms”.2 
One question thereby raised, which lies outside my scope and is not my 
concern here, concerns the actual contribution of readers and followers of Spinoza 
to the weakening of religious authority, the promotion of liberal norms and 
structures, and other defining marks of modernity: How heavily does Spinoza 
weigh in comparison with other thinkers in terms of historical effectiveness? The 
other question raised by the claim that Spinoza sponsors a progressive form of 
                                                 
1 Israel [2001] pp. 159–160. 
2 Israel [2006] pp. 524–525. See also the Preface in Israel [2010]. 
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Enlightenment and stands at the heart of modernity is this: To what extent is the 
historical efficacy of Spinozism, whatever it may amount to exactly, owed to 
Spinoza’s philosophy as such, to the force of Spinoza’s ideas qua ideas? Is Israel 
right that Spinoza pre-eminently ”forged a line of thought which furnished the 
philosophical matrix” of enlightened modernity? The distinction between ideas 
qua ideas, and ideas qua general causes of historical change, needs little 
explanation and is familiar from other contexts: the historical effects of Christian 
theism and Marxism are of staggering proportions but historical action in their 
name has been (most would agree) at best loosely connected with their rational 
content – making it a task to explain how they can have made the difference they 
have, given that their inherent rationality is not what has made them effective. 
As a thesis concerned with ideas qua ideas, Israel’s Spinoza-thesis is in my 
view hard to defend,3 and I will attempt to make this plausible through 
a consideration of the role of Spinoza in classical German philosophy. That this 
falls in part outside Israel’s timeframe does not affect the point at issue, for if the 
German engagement with Spinoza shows what I suggest, then it is difficult to see 
how Spinoza could have provided, to the extent that Israel supposes, the 
ideological source of the triumph of secular democratic modernity. From this it 
does not follow that there is no truth in Israel’s narrative. What should instead be 
maintained is that two distinguishable strands are active in Enlightenment 
thinking, one (broadly) humanistic and the other (broadly) naturalistic, 
corresponding roughly to what Israel identifies as respectively the moderate and 
radical forms of Enlightenment. Their distinctness and potential for conflict is 
evident to us now – the constant impinging of self-assured science on our secular 
yet insecure humanistic conceptions is a dominant feature of our intellectual 
landscape – but it was also, as Israel has revealed in astonishing depth and detail, 
a dynamic within the Enlightenment itself. Even though Spinoza is not as 
unequivocally naturalistic as Israel implies,4 it would nonetheless seem essentially 
                                                 
3 Helpful critical discussions of Israel, with which I largely concur, may be found in Stuurman 
[2002] and La Vopa [2009]. 
4 In his summaries of Spinoza’s thought in Israel [2001] Chs. 14–15, Israel’s emphasis is firmly on 
Spinoza’s affiliations with mechanistic explanation and the anti-religious implications thereof. This 
registers but one aspect of Spinoza; Israel, taking it for the whole, is led to say that ”his philosophy 
was based on modern science both experimental and deductive” and to suggest that Spinoza’s 
claim for the exceptionless character of natural law is a ”scientific” theory demonstrated by 
”experiment and mathematical calculation”, which are ”the sole criterion of truth” (Israel [2001] 
p. 244). As if viewing Spinoza solely through the eyes of the philosophes, or taking the only 
important point at issue to be the non-existence of the theistic supernatural, Israel suppresses the 
sense in which Spinoza’s ”naturalism” is not in our sense naturalistic – the Nature into which 
Spinoza absorbs man is not that of modern natural science and nor are the latter’s methods those of 
Spinoza. 
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correct to align Spinoza with the naturalistic side of Enlightenment and to identify 
naturalism as what allowed Enlightenment thinking to assume more aggressive 
critical forms. Now if naturalism has the best claim to the authority of reason, if it 
is (as many in the present day believe) the completed form of Enlightenment, then 
Israel’s view of Spinoza as presiding over modernity is to that extent justified. 
What does not follow from this, however, is that Spinoza’s philosophy furnished 
sufficient materials for intellectually shaping the modern world. The following 
narrative seems more probable. The features of Spinozism that allowed it to cut so 
deeply also constituted, or implied, its limitations: its critical force was not 
matched by a constructive potential, and in order to make up for this deficit it was 
necessary to draw on intellectual resources external to Spinoza or (what comes 
to the same) to read Spinoza in terms drawn from traditions which he rejected.5 To 
the extent that historical figures may have understood themselves to be agents of 
Spinozism in their advocacy of new social and political edifices, they were 
borrowing materials that did not belong to the conceptual package sanctioned by 
Spinoza. If we ask where these came from, there is no choice but to acknowledge 
that they belonged to the humanistic strand in Enlightenment that Israel calls 
moderate and characterizes merely as prone to compromise and lacking nerve. 
The Enlightenment thus combined two vectors, one of which cleared the ground 
and found a formidable resource in Spinoza, while the other drew on concepts 
and intellectual traditions repudiated by him: both were necessary for the 
formation of intellectual modernity, contrary to Israel’s picture of the latter as 
merely putting the brakes on the former. 
In so far as reductive naturalism has not yet won the argument, the process 
and final meaning of Enlightenment remains undetermined. To valorize ”radical” 
over ”moderate” Enlightenment, as Israel does, is implicitly to take the side of 
naturalism, a standpoint which is of course open to defence, but the consistency 
of which with the political values of modernity needs to be shown, and 
completing this task cannot be a matter of intellectual history alone. 
One way of making the case for the limited constructive role of Spinozism 
would be, therefore, with reference to his political philosophy. Though this is not 
what I will concentrate on here, some brief comments can be made in order to 
indicate the difficulty facing the Spinoza-thesis on this front. Granted that, as 
                                                 
5 Bury’s classic [1920] Ch. 5, describes the period 1680–1740, in which Descartes’ ideas were used as 
a solvent, as ”Cartesian”, and circa 1750 as marking a change of consciousness, centred on the idea 
of man’s progress – a transition from (negative) Cartesianism to (positive) humanism. The 
eighteenth-century French thinkers valorized by Israel as Spinoza’s heirs were not rigorous 
materialists. 
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Israel points out, Spinoza is no straightforward Hobbesian,6 still there are 
a multitude of respects in which Spinoza’s conception of the political order 
appears sharply at variance with the political culture of Western liberal 
democracy. Spinoza does indeed insist on individual freedom of thought, favours 
democratic republicanism as a constitutional form, and even identifies freedom as 
the purpose of the state,7 but attention needs to be paid to the basis on which he 
reaches these results – otherwise we risk mistaking agreement concerning the 
letter of political doctrine for agreement überhaupt and in substance. The basis 
advanced by Spinoza for liberal principles and democratic rule is that right 
extends as far and only as far as power, that the need for security is what uniquely 
occasions the formation of the state, and that the normative and psychological 
ground of civil society lies in enlightened, non-passionate judgements of self- 
-interest.8 Notions of the intrinsic value of personhood and autonomy play no role 
in forging the social bond; the idea that certain political norms are necessary in 
direct consequence of the dignity of the human individual, as an entity elevated 
above common nature and possessing a power of self-determination not possessed 
by other things, is absent. From this it follows that conceptions of justice and 
equality must be held at a certain strength and that values taken as axiomatic in 
our actual political culture are present in Spinoza only on a consequentialist basis. 
The freedom realized in Spinoza’s state has a more positive character than 
Hobbesian liberty, but it is not the full-strength modern conception, and whatever 
demands for equality Spinoza may allow to be affirmed will rest on contingencies 
of mutual utility.9 
To make these observations is not to fault Spinoza’s conception of the 
nature or foundation of political order but to indicate its revisionary character. If 
the Kantianism which is currently dominant in normative political theory is as 
fantastical and hollow as some critics allege, then Spinoza’s political thought is 
                                                 
6 See Israel’s Introduction to his edition of Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise. Spinoza’s is 
”unquestionably not just the earliest but also the most sweeping, and is arguably also historically 
the most important” of early theories of toleration (Israel [2007] p. xxii); the ”radical wing of the 
Enlightenment” – and not Locke’s – ”was the source of our own ’modernity’ [... and] cut 
a historically more direct, and ultimately more important, path towards modern western 
individualism” (Israel [2007] p. xxvii); Spinoza argued ”unequivocally, forcefully, and as an 
intrinsic and central part of his system that democracy is and must always be the best form of 
human organization” (Israel [2007] p. xxviii). 
7 Theological-Political Treatise, Chs. 16 and 20. 
8 Similar points can be made regarding Spinoza’s ethics: virtue, or action in accordance with 
reason, is, according to Book IV of the Ethics, a striving to preserve one’s being and increase one’s 
perfection, that is, one’s power. 
9 See Lord [2014]. 
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due re-examination, as offering something more robust than neo-Kantian 
principles of justice but less illiberal than Hobbes. But, to repeat, championing of 
Spinoza for the cause of political modernity is no easy matter, for there is no plain 
fit. 
2. Spinoza in classical German philosophy 
The story of Spinoza’s reception in German philosophy begins in 1688 with 
Thomasius’ denunciation of what he perceived as the concealed growth of 
Spinozism, and attack on Tschirnhaus for his alleged sympathies. The problem 
of Spinoza occupies centre stage for a brief but important period in the early 
eighteenth century, causing Wolff’s temporary expulsion from Halle in 1723 and 
ensuring that, for the rest of his career, Wolff would take pains to mark the 
distance separating his Leibnizian metaphysics from the neighbouring rationalism 
of Spinozism. Thereafter, until some way into the second half of the eighteenth 
century, Spinoza is refused entry into civic and scholarly discourse in Germany. 
Hermann Samuel Reimarus, though following the anti-Scriptural agenda of 
Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise, retained deist convictions. Overall then it 
may be agreed that Spinoza’s exclusion from German intellectual life – which 
throughout the eighteenth century remained more protective of religion and less 
antagonistic towards its institutions than contemporary developments in France 
and Britain, the Aufklärung having a generally moderate character, especially as 
regards matters of state and social order – conforms to Israel’s Spinoza-thesis. 
So too, it may be thought, do developments in the early period of classical 
German philosophy, from 1781 to roughly 1792. The Pantheismusstreit, the late 
eighteenth-century explosion of Spinoza into the German public sphere, though at 
the surface concerned simply with the question of what Lessing had believed in 
matters of religion, revolved more deeply around the question of what can be 
expected to ensue from the unbridled use of reason. Its instigator, Friedrich 
Heinrich Jacobi, identified Spinozism as the philosophical standpoint most 
directly opposed to theism, and at the same time lauded Spinoza for the 
unsurpassed consistency of his reasonings. In addition, Kant may seem to bear out 
the Spinoza-thesis: following Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition, Kant characterizes 
Spinozism as posing the most profound threat to morality of all the speculative 
systems, and offers transcendental idealism as an antidote.10 Though Kant’s own 
system was by no means anodyne – the Critique of Pure Reason was quickly 
perceived as philosophically revolutionary, as Kant had claimed, many 
                                                 
10 In the Critique of Practical Reason, 5: 100–102: Kant [1996] pp. 220–222. 
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contemporaries judging it profoundly destructive (”all crushing”, according to 
Mendelssohn11) – Kant is without radical credentials in Israel’s sense: in denying 
a right of resistance or revolution in his 1793 essay on political theory and practice 
Kant declined to sanction the French Revolution, to the surprise and 
disappointment of many of his followers,12 and having in his practical 
philosophical writings argued for the necessity of theistic postulates as correlates 
of morality, he published late in life a rational defence of religion which 
revalidated a fair quantity of Church doctrine and allowed itself to be recruited to 
the cause of orthodoxy. 
However, even in this early period the pattern of ideological commitments 
does not fit the Spinoza-thesis. The quarrelling parties in the Pantheismusstreit did 
not divide over degree of political radicalism, and neither took the side of Spinoza 
in opposition to theism.13 Though a fierce critic of the French Revolution, Jacobi’s 
own commitments were fiercely liberal and anti-absolutist,14 and the form of 
theism he defended was unorthodox, not to say radical: the crux of Jacobi’s 
strategy in the Letters Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza15 was to seek to force, 
by focussing on Spinoza’s rationalistic (putative) atheism, an acknowledgement of 
the absolute basicness of an intuitive affective power underlying all awareness 
of truths and objects, and this general reconception of knowledge, though contrary 
to the Aufklärung conception of rational religion, was not reactionary in the sense 
of reasserting the rights of tradition or authority; on the contrary, by centering 
faith in self-consciousness, Jacobi provided for a kind of doxastic autonomy. 
Jacobi’s opponent Moses Mendelssohn, a towering figure in the Berlin 
Aufklärung, held more mainstream views regarding the nature of revealed 
religion and, importantly, took a much more favourable view of Spinoza, arguing 
in his 1785 Morgenstunden that the difference of Spinoza’s pantheism from theism 
reduces, once the content of the former has been properly determined, to an 
extremely fine speculative point concerning the relation of God and the world that 
cannot even be stated without metaphorical imagery.16 Herder’s contribution to 
                                                 
11 Mendelssohn [1785] Vorbericht: ”die Werke [...] des alles zermalmenden Kants.” 
12 See Maliks [2012]. 
13 The literature on the Pantheismusstreit is extensive. Recent and helpful is Goldenbaum [2011]. 
14 See Jacobi [1996]. Jacobi associates himself in this piece with Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Spinoza. 
On Jacobi’s politics, see Beiser [1992] Ch. 6. 
15 Jacobi [1994]. 
16 Mendelssohn [2011] Chs. 13–14. Mendelssohn had in fact three decades earlier in his 
Philosophische Gespräche spoken up for Spinoza, whom he there presents as one of the great 
philosophers, necessary for the transition from Descartes to Leibniz, and as having invented the 
 
Sebastian Gardner ◦ Spinoza, Enlightenment, and Classical German Philosophy 
 29 
the Streit, Gott, einige Gespräche über Spinozas System (1787), endorses the 
rehabilitation of Spinoza, with an additional emphasis on nature as being in its 
essence purposive living activity. Thus whereas Jacobi argued that Spinoza 
precluded theism but can and must be overcome, Mendelssohn and Herder 
maintained that Spinoza, made self-consistent and accordingly refined, poses no 
threat, rather he paves the way to a correct understanding of divinity. What is 
most striking about these developments is that they show the reception of Spinoza 
to have entered a new phase, in which the sense of his thought is considered in 
newly sophisticated terms. 
Regarding Kant, the central point to be made – vital for all later contexts – is 
that his opposition to Spinoza had an impeccable progressive Enlightenment 
rationale and was nowise the effect of an aversion to radicality.17 Kant’s political 
philosophy, no less than Spinoza’s, insists on the limits of the state and the 
necessity of individual freedom, and its implications for political reform, though 
articulated only in a muted form by Kant himself, were impossible to deny. Kant’s 
reason for rejecting Spinozism was quite simply the absolute impossibility, as he 
perceived it, of providing grounds for morality and hence for liberal political 
principles on the basis of a monism which denies substantial existence to human 
agents – the ancient criticism of Spinoza going back to Bayle (”if man is only 
a modification, he does nothing”18) but possessing increased force in the Kantian 
context, where the concept of human agency has assumed a foundational role for 
value. 
Israel however discusses Kant’s philosophy and its significance for 
modernity as if aiming to save Church and State had conditioned the construction 
of the Critical system.19 This underplays the degree to which Kant’s moral religion 
was finely poised between conservative and radical implications – it pointed as 
much to the quasi-atheism that lost Fichte his post at Jena as it did to the Scriptural 
supernaturalism of Gottlob Christian Storr’s Tübingen school – and in any case, 
and more importantly, it fails to recognize that Kant’s moral theology addressed 
a genuine problem for which some solution had to be found: namely the problem 
                                                                                                                                                    
doctrine of pre-established harmony (Mendelssohn [1997] pp. 100, 106–108). Arguments from that 
early work are carried over into Morgenstunden. 
17 See Deligiorgi [2005] Ch. 1. 
18 Bayle [1965] p. 313. 
19 Israel [2011] Ch. 26. Also relevant is the discussion of Enlightenment moral theory in Israel [2010] 
Ch. 5, where the radical wing is represented as de-moralizing and thus emancipating natural 
desires and affects, and the anti-philosophes (Rousseau included) as merely seeking to protect 
morality’s theological connections. The present question however concerns the adequacy for 
modern moral thought of the psychological mechanisms appealed to by the nouveaux philosophes. 
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of making moral action purposive given the indifference of Nature, qua 
Newtonian causal matrix, to the ends of Freedom. Kant’s concept of the highest 
good, whence derives his moral theology, responds to this demand, which did not 
and could not have figured on the agenda of the French materialists. No such 
problem presented itself to Spinoza, not because he had opted for the exclusive 
reality of Kant’s Nature in opposition to Freedom, but rather because his Nature 
was already as theologically rich and remote from bare naturalism as could be 
required: the highest good, as Part V of the Ethics teaches, consists in knowledge 
of God and its corresponding affect, an achievement which rests on the human 
individual’s identity with an eternal idea in God’s intellect. Whatever may be said 
concerning the relative merits of Spinoza’s and Kant’s systems in this and other 
regards, there is no case to be made for the greater metaphysical austerity and 
hence political modernity of the former: Spinoza and Kant are in equal measure 
up to their necks in noumenal conceptions (with the difference, arguably testifying 
to his greater modernity, that Kant restricts his claims about noumena to ”mere 
practical cognition”). 
The next wave of developments in classical German philosophy replays and 
develops these themes but weighs more pointedly against the Spinoza-thesis. The 
generation that succeeded Jacobi and Kant had unquestionably radical intentions. 
Friedrich Schlegel’s aphorism 216 from the 1798 Athenäum Fragmente famously 
reads: ”The French Revolution, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, and Goethe’s Meister 
are the great tendencies of the age.”20 Fichte had published in 1793–1794 
a Contribution towards Correcting the Public’s Judgement of the French 
Revolution, arguing that this development could be judged only in light of 
rational principles based on freedom, thus endorsing the revolutionary ideology;21 
Schiller was sufficiently attuned to the ideological aims of the French Revolution 
to feel intense disappointment at its degeneration, precipitating the diagnostic 
enquiry undertaken in his Letters on Aesthetic Education (1793–1795);22 Friedrich 
Schlegel’s Essay on the Concept of Republicanism (1796) argued for the conceptual 
equivalence of state, republic, and democracy, and the possibility of legitimate 
insurrection;23 Schleiermacher sympathized wholeheartedly with the French 
Revolution and in his Monologen (1800) criticized the Aufklärung for its political 
                                                 
20 Beiser [1996] p. 118. 
21 Fichte [1845–1746]. 
22 Schiller [1982] especially Letters 3–6. 
23 See Schlegel [1996] pp. 99, 102 and 111. On Schlegel’s politics, see Izenberg [1992] Ch. 2, and 
Beiser [1992] Ch. 10. 
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limitations, which he (like Schlegel) related to its failure to grasp human 
individuality in an adequately profound manner, resulting also in an 
impoverished conception of community;24 Schelling, Hölderlin, and Hegel in their 
early days at the Tübingen Stift were partisans of the French cause, in which they 
saw a political spirit antithetical to the Duchy of Württemberg and that moulds all 
of their earliest philosophical and literary work.25 The situation of Fichte, Schiller, 
Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Schelling, Hölderlin, and Hegel, in relation to the older 
generation identified with the limited achievements of the Aufklärung, thus 
corresponds as closely as could be desired to Israel’s distinction of radicals and 
moderates. And, just as Israel’s thesis predicts, a turn to Spinoza is the next move. 
But for the Spinoza-thesis everything turns on how Spinoza was construed. What 
exactly did progressive post-Kantian thinkers regard Spinoza as supplying that 
would carry them beyond the stagnant and unsatisfactory Aufklärung and assist 
in raising human development to a new level? Did they, as the Spinoza-thesis 
leads us to expect, turn away from the ”softened” Spinoza of Mendelssohn and 
Herder and return to the ”hard” Spinoza of la Mettrie? 
The first question has no simple answer, not least because each of the post- 
-Kantians interpreted Spinoza differently and took a different view of his 
significance for their own philosophical project, but one thing is clear: in no case 
was Spinoza taken up and recruited to the philosophically radical cause on the 
strength of his naturalism, if we understand by that the God-supplanting 
materialism that the philosophes found in him or even Spinoza’s thesis of the 
exhaustiveness of the laws of nature. Only in one case – Schelling’s, for the brief 
period when he avowed a realism based on Naturphilosophie – can it be said that 
Spinoza’s identification of reality as a whole with nature was of importance on its 
own account. The Spinoza renaissance in German philosophy was premised 
altogether on an idealistic overhaul of Spinoza’s metaphysics, which involved 
above all a restoration of freedom and teleology. The answer to the second 
question is therefore firmly negative.26 
                                                 
24 See especially Schleiermacher’s second and third Monologues in Beiser [1996] pp. 174–176 and 
187–192, and Izenberg [1992] pp. 35–50. 
25 See Nauen [1971]. In Hegel the revolutionary impetus carried through in the 1790s to a sustained 
critique of existing Christianity, guided by a conception of civic piety and/as political virtue (on 
which see Dickey [1987]). 
26 Which is not to deny the existence of radical German thinkers outside the post-Kantian idealist 
development. Israel groups together Adam Weishaupt, Carl Friedrich Bahrdt, and Georg Forster 
as successors of Lessing and Herder belonging to the ”German Radical Enlightenment”, stressing 
the importance of d’Holbach et al – but not Spinoza – for Weishaupt and Bahrdt (Israel [2010] pp. 
70–81, and Israel [2011] pp. 828–852). 
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A brief sketch of post-Kantian thought helps to make clear how and why 
radical political intentions necessitated a Spinoza of the sort envisaged by Herder. 
If the key to progressive politics rested on the understanding of freedom as 
autonomy – the lesson of Kant, concretely emblematized in the French Revolution 
– and if the philosophical limitations of Kant (irrespective of his political 
limitations, with which the former might or might not be thought to be connected) 
resulted in the final analysis from his refusal to step beyond the dualism of Nature 
and Freedom in order to form an integral concept of the totality to which the two 
realms belong, then the correct trajectory was towards monism: the preeminent 
model for which lay in Spinoza, but which needed to be invested – in so far as the 
aim of the whole strategy was to validate autonomy – with freedom of a kind that 
can be thought to flow down to the empirically real, historically concrete human 
subject. The first such development of major importance, Fichte’s 
Wissenschaftslehre, though presented by Fichte as antithetical to Spinoza’s system 
of ”dogmatism”, makes exactly this Spinozistic move: the absolute Ich provides 
for the unity of Nature and Freedom, of theoretical and practical reason, and plays 
the systematic role of Spinoza’s One Substance.27 This postulate allows Fichte to 
construct a theory of natural rights and an ethical theory: the positing for each 
individual subject of a sphere of freedom defined by right, and the self-legislation 
of the moral law, derive from the need to relate coherently the I of empirical 
subjectivity and the absolute I. 
The same pattern is repeated in Schelling’s earliest writings, but with an 
explicit statement of the positive debt to Spinoza. In a letter to Hegel from 1795, 
Schelling asserts that ”Kant has swept everything away,” scorns the attempt 
of (Tübingen) theologians to append to the Kantian letter ”the old superstition of 
so-called natural religion as well as of positive religion”, and declares that he is 
working ”on an ethic à la Spinoza”, ”designed to establish the highest principles 
of all philosophy, in which theoretical and practical reason are united”.28 The work 
in question, Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte im 
menschlichen Wissen (1795), describes itself as a Gegenstück to Spinoza’s Ethics, 
and as annulling the foundations of Spinoza’s system, toppling it by means of its 
own principles; yet also as preserving its ”bold consequences”, and as carrying 
over Spinoza’s principles in order to furnish the hitherto missing highest ground 
of Kant’s philosophy.29 Spinoza’s superior principles are the unarticulated 
                                                 
27 See Fichte [1982] pp. 101–102, 117–119, 146. 
28 Hegel [1984] p. 29. 
29 Schelling [1980] pp. 63–69. 
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presuppositions of Kant, and they concern the Unconditioned which Kant had 
excluded from cognition in the strict sense: Schelling aims to show that this 
Spinozian ”ultimate” is ”the only immediacy in our knowledge [...] the principle 
of which Spinoza could say that it is the light which illuminates itself and the 
darkness”. 
The systematic intention here is therefore highly complex, but what 
presently deserves emphasis is Schelling’s claim that this ”second revolution” in 
philosophy, following Kant’s, is designed to transform human life: 
It is a daring step of reason to liberate mankind and to remove it from the terrors 
of the objective world, but this daring venture cannot fail, because man grows in 
the measure in which he learns to know himself and his power. Give man the 
awareness of what he is and he will soon learn to be what he ought to be. Give him 
the theoretical self-respect and the practical will soon follow. One would hope in 
vain for any great progress of mankind as a result of the mere goodwill of man, 
because in order to become better he would have had to be good already. For that 
very reason the revolution in man must come from the awareness of his essence; 
he must be good theoretically in order to become so practically. The surest 
preparatory exercise for harmonious action within oneself is the knowledge that 
the very essence of man consists of unity and is due to it alone. Once a man has 
realized that, he will also understand that the unity of volition and action must 
become as natural and necessary for him as the preservation of his existence. It is 
the very goal of man that the unity of volition and action should become as natural 
to him as the mechanism of his body and unity of his consciousness.30 
The key to Schelling’s extraction of dynamic social and political consequences 
from a philosophy which makes its highest principle that of freedom, is its 
teaching that man is in his essence non-objective: ”man is not a thing, not a chattel, 
and in his very nature no object at all”. When Schelling describes philosophy as 
emancipating ”the slaves of objective truth by giving them an inkling of freedom”, 
this is not mere rhetoric: our practical existence, according to Schelling, is 
constituted by the demand that we realize the Unconditioned in ourselves – the 
”highest call of all practical philosophy” is to exist as a ”noumenon” subject to no 
heteronomous power.31 This final aim subsumes the various intellectual projects of 
modernity: the ”law of freedom” provides the point of convergence, ”the focus 
of truth”, of the presently progressing human and natural sciences. In so far as the 
                                                 
30 Schelling [1980] pp. 67–68. 
31 Schelling [1980] p. 92 and (in Schelling’s 1796 Neue Deduktion der Naturrecht) pp. 221–222. 
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ultimate end for man is a condition in which the distinction which makes the 
concepts of right and duty meaningful has been transcended, and which therefore 
obviates the need for coercion, the radical implication of Schelling’s thought at this 
period veers towards an overcoming of the need for the state.32 The Marxian 
resonances of Schelling’s passage are therefore no accident. 
Schelling’s metaphysics, which follow Kant and Fichte in requiring that 
we think of ourselves in dual terms, both as items within nature and also as 
non-empirical subjects, are in flat contradiction to French naturalism but 
continuous with Spinoza, whose conception of a life of virtue and reason is 
properly inseparable from the metaphysical claims of the first two books of the 
Ethics, and the revolution in consciousness that Schelling calls on philosophy to 
induce parallels the liberation from passion posited by Spinoza. By contrast, the 
conception of man as exclusively natural in a strictly empirical sense provides 
a basis for nothing more than eudaemonism – a conception of the good which was 
entirely compatible with paternalism and which had allowed itself to be co-opted 
by Aufklärung advocates of enlightened absolutism, as Kant had emphasized.33 
The programme of rethinking practical concepts in the combined light of 
Kant and Spinoza could of course be taken in other directions. Schlegel in his 
1800–01 lectures on transcendental philosophy, again working from the premise 
that ”every individual presents the whole”, while also accepting that individuals 
must be considered not individually but only in the light of the vocation of 
humanity as a whole, formulates an alternative according to which the organic 
unity of the republic rests on the ”sympathetic virtues”.34 Schlegel at this date fails 
the test of radicality – he now considers aristocracy the correct constitutional form, 
and religion to be constitutive of republican life – but the relevant point is that 
Spinozism has here been turned once again against mechanistic conceptions of 
political order (mechanism is, Schlegel says, ”the evil principle in philosophy and 
reality”35). 
Following the suggestion of Lucien Goldmann,36 the post-Kantian idealists’ 
concern with unification may be related to two broad characteristics of 
                                                 
32 Schelling [1980] p. 121 note. 
33 In his 1793 ”Theorie/Praxis” essay, 8: 290–291: ”A government established on the principle of 
benevolence [...] is the greatest despotism thinkable.” (Kant [1996] p. 291) 
34 The relevant sections are extracted in Beiser [1996] pp. 143–158. Note also the entry in Schlegel’s 
notebooks, 1798–1801: ”The French Revolution will become universal only through the German.” 
(Beiser [1996] p. 166) 
35 Beiser [1996] p. 150. 
36 Goldmann [1973] Ch. 1. 
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Enlightenment thought, namely its individualistic atomism, and its lack of an 
integrated view of the relation of theory and practice: correcting these deficiencies 
required the construction of a new, higher and holistic, conceptual layer. Hegel’s 
discussion of Aufklärung in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) emphasizes the 
thinness of Enlightenment conceptions of value and cognition, and the consequent 
need for it to borrow from the Reich des Glaubens.37 The post-Kantian idealist 
development is directly downstream from their fusion. Hegel’s own conception of 
ethico-political life, Sittlichkeit, is a late and heavily reworked descendant of the 
programme originally formulated in Schelling’s Vom Ich, designed to incorporate 
the subjective freedom of the individual affirmed in the Aufklärung and 
supremely articulated by Kant, in combination with the necessity of a collective 
life in which individual freedom can find itself realized. 
What is of greatest value in Spinoza and philosophically indispensable for 
post-Kantian idealism is therefore the very dimension of his thought that turns no 
wheels for the French materialists – the concept of totality and correlative 
conception of the human subject as linked to the One-and-All through a relation 
other than material inclusion. Though the dynamic of the post-Kantian Spinozistic 
development lies in the autonomous needs of philosophical reason, and 
accordingly proceeds at a high level of abstraction, this abstractness at the same 
time underpins its orientation towards the actual social world: to think out the 
problems of metaphysics with a view to satisfaction of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason was at the same time to project a rational historical future; in the same way 
that the Ethics begins with metaphysics and on that basis yields a conception of 
practical life, early German Idealism envisages philosophical reason resolving 
itself into a higher form of collective life.38 
If we pose the question of why these German intellectuals, finding 
themselves in a social world still permeated with religious conception and lagging 
severely in terms of its political development, did not repeat the moves and credos 
of the French materialists, the answer is not that Christianity retained 
a psychological hold which they were unable to shake off, but that they had 
derived from Kant and other sources an appreciation of the extremely complex 
and demanding nature of modern freedom and a correspondingly sharp 
perception of the philosophical limitations of eighteenth-century French thought. 
Religious consciousness and theological concepts did not need to be deleted from 
                                                 
37 Hegel [1977] §§ 526–581. 
38 An important document of this intention is the ”Oldest System-Programme” fragment: Harris 
[1972] pp. 510–512. 
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their cognitive stock, because they offered philosophical resources for the 
constructive task at hand and, Spinoza showed, could be incorporated in 
a non-retrograde manner.39 The vaulting of German thought over its external 
historical circumstances grew out of this constellation of factors. Whether or not 
the German Idealist synthesis in any of its forms is philosophically successful, the 
vital point in regard to Israel’s Spinoza-thesis is that the idealist project rests on an 
appreciation of the sheer conceptual complexity of modernity and responds 
constructively to the tensions that inhabit it – in comparison with which the 
outlook of Système de la nature, however much greater its value in providing an 
effective platform for the criticism of existing social institutions, appears 
superficial and unsatisfactory. 
One point of particular importance for the Spinoza-thesis as Israel argues it 
concerns the concept of evolution, the Darwinian theory of which is cemented into 
our conception of enlightened modernity. Here too Israel asserts Spinoza’s 
centrality: the mid-eighteenth century’s ”probing towards the concept of evolution 
from inert matter, and of higher from lower forms of life”, Israel says, can be 
referred back to Spinoza’s claim ”that Nature is self-moving, and creates itself”.40 
This construal of the intellectual legacy is, however, highly questionable. 
The inclusion of motion in the essence of matter was a general characteristic of all 
non-Cartesian early modern natural philosophy, and the self-moving character of 
nature, particularly when this is taken in connection with organic life, is most 
obviously associated with Leibniz’s vis viva. The impetus to Darwin’s theory in 
any case had its principal sources, as work by Richard Roberts and others has 
shown,41 not in eighteenth- or nineteenth-century materialism but in the legacy of 
classical German philosophy, and while it is true that, as we have just said, 
Spinozism had been absorbed into this legacy, it was on terms that disarmed it of 
its hard naturalistic edge and in effect subordinated Spinoza’s contribution to that 
of Leibniz: the Darwin-conducive conception of nature as creative, and of natural 
forms as mutually productive, whether in a metaphysical or an empirical temporal 
sense, depended squarely on the attribution of ends to nature, in the spirit of 
Leibniz’s monadology but contra Spinoza. 
There is one more chapter in the German philosophical development which 
deserves mention, since it underscores the conclusion that Spinoza’s own 
                                                 
39 Of the figures named above, only Schleiermacher holds fast to theism, but even in his case there 
is an intention to transform its character, drawing on Spinoza: see the second of Schleiermacher’s 
[1988] influential speeches On Religion (1799). 
40 Israel [2001] p. 160. See also the passage from Israel quoted at the beginning of this paper. 
41 See Roberts [2002, and 2013], and Sloan [2005]. 
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philosophy was not equipped to support constructive Enlightenment thought. 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are properly viewed as forming a distinctive strand 
in the history of late modern philosophy. Both have debts to Kant, Schopenhauer 
explicitly and Nietzsche by way of Schopenhauer and later nineteenth-century 
Kantians, but both regard the post-Kantian development with either outright 
contempt (Schopenhauer) or indifference tinged with condescension (Nietzsche). 
And in both cases their rejection of the German Idealist legacy has an important 
connection with Spinoza. The World as Will and Representation may be 
interpreted as an attempt to strip out of Spinozism all of the humanistic and 
axiologically positive elements that had accreted to it in the hands of the German 
Idealists and to restore its critical bite. Accordingly the connection with freedom is 
severed by Schopenhauer in favour of strict determinism: he quotes approvingly 
Spinoza’s dictum that if a stone projected through the air had consciousness, it 
would imagine it was flying of its own will.42 Schopenhauer’s version of 
transcendentalism departs from Kant’s most sharply at the point where he asserts 
a physiological explanation and ground for cognition: the intellect is identified 
with the brain, a natural organ trained on the fulfilment of needs. The 
transcendental and physiological aspects of subjectivity are thus related in 
something like the way that Thought and Extension are related for Spinoza. The 
necessary existence of the causa sui is rejected by Schopenhauer, but the 
implication of monism, that the totality of what exists does so for no end, is 
embraced.43 In the case of Nietzsche, the connection takes the form of an explicit 
self-association: in the oft-quoted postcard to Franz Overbeck, 30 July 1881, 
Nietzsche announces delightedly that he has discovered in Spinoza a predecessor, 
one who, like Nietzsche himself, repudiates freedom of the will, teleology, the 
moral world-order, altruism, and evil. In Twilight of the Idols (1888), composed in 
the final year of his authorship, Spinozian necessitarianism and monism are 
embraced as ”the great liberation”, the sole means ”to restore the innocence 
of becoming”.44 In Nietzsche Spinoza becomes again the uncompromising 
hard-edged thinker who inspired French eighteenth-century radicals, but this 
                                                 
42 Schopenhauer [1966] Vol. 1, p. 126. 
43 Ibidem, Vol. 2, p. 642: ”that the inner essence in all things is absolutely one and the same, has by 
my time already been grasped and understood, after the Eleatics, Scotus Erigena, Giordano Bruno, 
and Spinoza had taught it in detail, and Schelling had revived this doctrine. But what this one is, 
and how it manages to exhibit itself as the many, is a problem whose solution is first found in my 
philosophy.” Through his doctrine of the subjectivity of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, 
Schopenhauer may be regarded as reducing durational finite modes to a function of what Spinoza 
calls imagination. 
44 Nietzsche [2005] p. 182. 
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Spinoza is now put to work to destroy Enlightenment ideals – not least, of course, 
its political values. In so far as Nietzsche’s critical practice is continuous with the 
French eighteenth-century critique of religion, Nietzsche is sometimes said to have 
turned the Enlightenment against itself – that is, the ”radical” Enlightenment 
against the ”moderate”.45 It is no exaggeration to say that Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche show what lies in store if radical Enlightenment, as defined in Israel’s 
terms, is taken to its logical conclusion. The German Idealists’ (re-)spiritualization 
of Spinoza was undertaken, as if with historical foresight, with a view to meeting 
this threat. 
3. Intellectual history and modernity 
Intellectual history spans two different types of relation, the conceptual or 
logical relations that ideas bear to one another, and the dynamic temporal 
relations of historical agents, and it aims at their integration, a unitary picture that 
explains why men’s beliefs concerning the True and the Good make sense to them 
in light of the world in which they find themselves, and how those beliefs make 
a difference to what men do and to what subsequently issues from their actions. 
Israel’s history of the Enlightenment concerns, accordingly, neither a tradition of 
theorizing nor a pattern of cultural changes in isolation from one another, but the 
two taken together. 
The interpenetration of the two types of relation is key to the project of 
intellectual history, but it is also bound to maintain their distinctness: when 
historical agents are considered purely as bearers of ideas, and their relations to 
one another are plotted in terms of judgements alone (affirmation, contradiction, 
confirmation, entailment, etc.), intellectual history resolves itself into the history of 
ideas. Intellectual history is distinguished by its adoption of a non-exclusive, 
open-ended conception of historical agents: the bearers of ideas are understood to 
be at the same time subjects with worldly desires who have interests to protect 
and advance, and whose identities are bound up with institutions and collective 
entities and all manner of cultural, social, political, economic and technological 
developments. It is possible as a distinctive form of enquiry, therefore, only on the 
condition that conceptual relations and non-ideational relations are distinguished. 
If historical development consisted in the unfolding of a set of concepts – if 
historical change were transparently a process of applying, instantiating, realizing 
ideas – then intellectual history would be identical with history in general, 
                                                 
45 A formula famously expanded by Adorno and Horkheimer into a complex narrative of 
Enlightenment and its late capitalist aftermath as a single process of reason’s self-liquidation. 
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providing its fundamental explanatory level. Conversely, if ideas were in 
themselves nothing but instruments and vehicles of non-ideational forces, then 
conceptual relations would have no sui generis character, and again intellectual 
history would disappear as a distinct enterprise. Because neither of these is the 
case – because human history is not pure thought activity, and because human 
thought implicates irreducibly conceptual relations yet participates in non- 
-ideational processes – intellectual history, as distinct from the history of ideas, is 
possible and necessary. And for the very same reason, its task presents a deep 
difficulty: waiving the nebulous, purely philosophical question of what makes 
possible the participation of thought in non-ideational historical processes, it is far 
from obvious, methodologically, how the two heterogeneous kinds of relation are 
to be interconnected in the practice of intellectual history, which, to repeat, has the 
task not of simply laying the two sets of relations alongside one another, but of 
inter-relating them in an intelligible fashion. 
These general statements, though open to elaboration and refinement, are 
I think fairly obvious, and I rehearse them only in order to highlight the special 
relation between the project of intellectual history as such and the particular topic 
of Enlightenment. Israel’s history of the Enlightenment is, as noted, intended as 
vindicatory: though accepting that the efficacy of ideas goes back to the social 
forces and cultural influences, Israel maintains the power of ideas qua ideas; his 
view is that whatever mass of conditions may be required for their formation, 
ideas once formed are able to play a direct causal role in history by virtue of their 
sheer rational meaning – in the same way, logically, that an individual human 
agent’s idea of some concrete desirable end can bring them to self-consciously act 
so as to realize that end.46 This belief is itself an article of faith of the 
Enlightenment, one that, if the vindicatory narrative is sound, the Enlightenment 
itself gives proof of – allowing Israel to claim to have written a history of the 
Enlightenment from its own point of view, moreover, a history which shows that 
                                                 
46 Israel [2006] pp. 529–530: ”the most vital aspects of modernity conceived as a philosophical 
package, namely democratic republicanism, equality racial and sexual, freedom of the individual, 
freedom of expression, liberty of the press, comprehensive (i.e. not limited, as in Locke) toleration, 
anti-colonialism, all the things that make a civilized reality at least thinkable today, have recently 
come to seem much more clearly and definitely products of the Enlightenment than it was possible 
for anyone, even the greatest enthusiast for these quintessentially ’modern’ values, to suppose 
twenty or thirty years ago”. See also Israel [2010] pp. 223–224: ”the rise, growth, and diffusion of 
Radical Enlightenment [... is] much the most important factor in any understanding of how and 
why the [French] Revolution developed as it did – that is, how and why it became a conscious 
and systematic effort to erase completely the institutions and consciousness of the past and replace 
these across the board with the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity”. Israel [2010] pp. 
87–88: ”everywhere it was the new ’philosophical’ content that chiefly counted. ’Philosophy’ was 
what lent form and a sharp edge” to the feeling of oppression. See also Israel [2011] pp. 924ff. 
Sebastian Gardner ◦ Spinoza, Enlightenment, and Classical German Philosophy 
 40 
very point of view to be grounded in a rational historical development. Such 
a reflexive narrative could then take up a place as the vital historiographical 
component of a more general view of modernity as an achievement of reason. 
It may be agreed with Israel that this picture is what we should seek to 
defend – we need it to be true, for it would be a plain disaster if it ceased to be 
possible to view history as a field of action in which reason and value can 
in principle be realized (that history has nothing to offer axiologically is the view 
of Schopenhauer – who believes, with unflinching consistency, that we need to 
free ourselves from agency). And in order for the claim that history is responsive 
to human reason to stand up, it must be possible to point to modern history as (in 
some sense) showing this to have actually occurred. But, to state the obvious, this 
view is open to challenge at multiple levels and from many directions, not just 
wild postmodernist quarters. In the very first place, a glance at classical social 
theory suffices to remind us that there is nothing self-evident in the idea that 
modern institutions and forms of life are essentially products of ideation, and not 
the auxiliary results (subjective reflections) of the fundamentally non-ideational 
processes of either capitalism (Marx) or industrialization (Durkheim) or 
rationalization (in Weber’s formal sense). To require the vindicatory view to 
confute its rivals would be no doubt to ask unreasonably much, yet it still faces the 
a priori difficulty indicated above: the ways in which men’s ideas concerning 
the True and the Good modify historical reality cannot be read off the outer 
empirical face of history, any more than historical agents have internal privileged 
access to the laws governing this process; between any intellectual system which 
pretends to grasp the fundamental nature of reality, and the world of historical 
agency, lies a thick mediating stratum; philosophical thought needs to be taken up 
in a particular determinate way in order to become historically effective, and the 
dispositions which condition this ”taking up” are bound up with social forces 
which cannot be regimented into a set of judgements.47 To the extent that this may 
be what critics of ”rationalistic” histories of the Enlightenment have in mind, their 
critiques are not without justification: Given that self-intelligible wholes of 
conceptual relations and historical developments are not to be found, what 
                                                 
47 As a relevant illustration, Jacob [1987] p. 270 describes the relation of the scientific revolution to 
the Enlightenment thus: ”It should be emphasized that the use of science to repudiate magic was 
frequently not the work of the scientists themselves [...] It was the new science as interpreted by the 
educated laity of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth-centuries that forever banished 
the superstitions (as they saw them) of the people from polite discourse. It was what individuals 
made of the natural philosophies of Descartes, Spinoza, Boyle and Newton that provoked la crise” 
(emphases added – S.G.). 
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guarantee do we have, why should we even consider it likely, that reason is what 
gives the rule in the ”translation” of ideas into historical reality?48 
In this light, Israel’s Spinoza-thesis appears as a scholarly brilliant attempt 
to validate the supposition that ideas – whatever accompanying and facilitating 
conditions may be required for them to enter concrete historical reality – can 
realize themselves in history by virtue of their rationality, by showing in an awe-
inspiring, intensively researched series of works that the total achievement of 
Enlightenment, when modernity is considered its product, is properly regarded as 
lying downstream from one individual mind’s exercise of reason. The problems 
facing Israel’s view are, first, that Spinoza’s philosophy does not, I have suggested, 
have the modernizing reach he claims for it, at least, not without idealist 
supplementation, whereby the non-radical ”moderate” intellectual legacy is 
reintroduced; and second, that Israel’s tendency to estimate the value of 
philosophical developments by their political progressiveness and supposition 
that this in turn requires convergence on late modern naturalism,49 implicitly 
denies the autonomy of philosophical reflection and thereby undercuts his 
objective of vindicating the Enlightenment tenet of the efficacy of reason. 
In conclusion let me point to an alternative route to vindicating 
Enlightenment, which comes out of Hegel and has been explored in depth by 
Robert Pippin.50 Hegel may seem an improbable resource to turn to at this 
juncture, in so far as he is commonly saddled with a ”logical blueprint” view 
of history of the very kind that provides ground and ammunition for the skeptical 
view of the relation of reason to history. It is true that Hegel affirms 
a non-empirical necessity governing the behaviour of ideas – a Concept regulating 
all concepts, a logic specifying how conceptions realize themselves according to 
their inner determinations – in the absence of which no deep order can be 
expected in human history. However, and this is the important point for present 
purposes, Hegel’s view of how concepts develop and gain concreteness in human 
history is far from naively rationalistic. The Phenomenology of Spirit is an attempt 
to demonstrate that the pressures generated by particular determinate ways of 
conceptualizing the world, the aporias and contradictions to which they give rise, 
force on reflective self-consciousness, without any teleological appreciation of the 
                                                 
48 The post-Kantian idealist development is of course itself not immune to non-rational 
explanation: see Brunschwig [1974] esp. Chs. 9–11. 
49 Israel has something in common in this regard with the French neo-marxist attempt to recruit 
Spinoza to the cause of historical materialism – in both cases political commitment leads to 
a truncated representation of Spinoza’s thought. Lord [2014] pp. 59–61 also draws the parallel. 
50 Pippin [1991, 1996, and 2008]. See also Pinkard [1994]. 
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process on its part, a series of inescapable transitions, the net result of which is 
a conception of the world approximating in its broad outlines to that of modernity. 
The underlying motor of this development is the structure of self-consciousness 
or, recast in a neo-pragmatist idiom, the constitutive norms of the social activity of 
reason-giving. To understand the formation of modernity in these terms – as the 
product of, so to speak, an invisible hand of reason – is to think that there is such 
a thing as Geist, but to believe in Geist is not to think that anything mental is 
present on the scene of human history beyond the minds of concrete historical 
agents – and, crucially, the logic which internally constrains them. To show that 
Geist is at work in history it is, of course, not enough to merely postulate its 
existence; but without its postulation, and the recounting of modern history in 
terms guided by that postulate, it is not easy to see how would-be vindicatory 
histories of the Enlightenment can avoid the pitfalls of the Spinoza-thesis. 
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